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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\VILBUR :JLA_ WHINNEY and RUTH 
E. :JI.A_ WHINNEY, 
PlaZ:utiffs and Appellants, 
-YS.-
JOHN A. JENSEN and ANN A 
JENSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
7537 
Respondents' Brief 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
The appeal in this action is based upon an order 
of the District Court sustaining respondents' Demurrer 
to appellants' Amended Complaint on the grounds that 
no cause of action had been alleged. Appellants were 
denied leave to amend. The matter was orally argued 
before the District Court and written briefs were ordered 
and submitted. The Court had previously sustained re-
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spondents' Demurrer to the original Complaint also 
upon the grounds that no cause of a~tion had been stated. 
The facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint are 
reproduced in appellants' brief, pages one to eighteen, 
and are correct, except insofar as an inventory attached 
to the principal contract involved is not set forth. How-
ever, the inventory is incorporated into the Amended 
Complaint and is part of the transcript on appeal, it 
being attached to the original Complaint. 
Both the order of the District Court in sustaining 
respondents' Demurrer to the original Complaint and 
the order sustaining the Demurrer to the Amended Com-
plaint were made pursuant to the Utah statutory rules 
of procedure as they existed prior to January 1, 1950. 
In those portions of this brief wherein reference is 
made to appellants' Amended Complaint or where it is 
summarized, every effort has been made to set forth its 
provisions or substance fairly and objectively. 
POINTS RELIED UPON FOR AFFIRMANCE 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUS-
TAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE 
FIRST' COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
IN APP·ELLANTS' AMENDED COMPLAINT ON 
THE· GR.O·UNDS THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION HAD 
NOT BEEN ALLEGED, AND FOR THE FOLLOW-
ING REASONS: 
a. A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORMING 
A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS NOT BEEN AL-
LEGED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN IT AP-
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PEARS FR{1~[ THE C0~1PLAINT THAT THE PAR-
TIES THERETO DID NOT PREVIOUSLY ARRIVE 
AT .A. FIN.A.Tj EXPRESSION OF THEIR INTEN-
TIOX, .A.ND ''THERE THE EFFECT OF REFORMA-
TIOX IS TO CRE.A.TE .A. CONTRACT UNINTENDED 
BY THE P .A.RTIES. 
b. J .. S _A_ :JL.A.TTER OF LAW, THE JURISDIC-
TIOX OF EQlTITY WILL NOT BE INVOKED TO 
REFOR~I _.:\_ WRITTEN INSTRUMENT WHEN IT 
APPEARS FRO~I THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE 
CO~IPLAINT TH.A.T THE CO~IPLAINANT HAS, 
BOTH SLEPT ON HIS RIGHTS AND HAS BEEN 
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE, IF 
A.XY, RESULTING TO HIMSELF. 
c. A CAUSE OF 1-\.CTION FOR REFORMING A 
WRITTEN IXSTR-Ul\1ENT HAS NOT BEEN AI..~­
LEGED, AS _A_ ni.A_TTER OF LA vV, IF IT APPEARS 
FRO~I THE COniPLAINT THAT THE INSTRU-
MENT, WHEN REDUCED TO WRITING, WAS 
SUCH AS THE PARTIES THEJ\IISELVES DE-
RIGXED IT TO BE. 
d. A CAUSE 0~-, .A.CTION FOR REFORMING 
A vVRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS NOT BEEN 
STA.TED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN THE 
ALLEGED RIGHT TO REFORMATION IS BASED 
UPON ORAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE IN-
STRU1fENT ITSFJLF DEJ\IONSTRATES THAT NO 
SUCH REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE. 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUS-
TAINED RESPONDFJNTS' DEMURRER TO THE 
SECOND COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF AC-
TION IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE 
REASON TI-IAT THIS COUNT FAILED TO STATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT P~OPERLY SUS-
TAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMUR,RER TO THE 
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THIRD COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE 
REASON THAT THIS COUNT FAILED TO STATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
4. TIUJ DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUS-
TAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE AMENDED 
. COMPLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT NO CAUSE 
OF ACTION HAD BEEN ALLEGED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1-a 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAIN-
ED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE FIRST 
COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
THE REASON THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
REFORJYIING A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAD 
NOT. BEEN A.LLEGED, AS A MATTER OF LAW\ 
WHEN IT APPEARS FROM THE COMPLAINT 
THAT THE PARTIES THERETO HAD NOT PRE-
VIOUSLY ARRIVED AT A FINAL EXPRESSION 
OF THEIR INTENTION, AND WHERE THE EF-
FECT OF REFORMATION IS TO CREATE A CON-
TRACT UNINENDED BY THE PARTIES. 
The jurisdiction of Equity is extended to reform 
the terms of a written instrument only when that instru-
ment fails, because of either fraud or mutual mistake, 
to reflect an earlier but final agreement reached between 
the parties. 53 C. J. 907 et seq. Reformation requires a 
previous final agreement to which the instrument may 
be made to conform as altered. A written document, 
therefore, cannot be reformed if it appears that the 
earlier agreement was not designed by the parties to 
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represent the final expression of their intention ( 45 Am. 
Jur. 586), and a Complaint "rhich demonstrates this to 
be the ease has failed to allege a cause of action. It is 
not sufficient to merely allege fraud. 
This proposition is not disputed by appellants, and 
on page 20 of their brief, the following appears: 
"ln..c;truments are rescinded rather tha.n re-
fornled 'vhere there has been no prior intention 
to be implemented by the writing in question, 
though the other elements of a. reformation are 
present.'' 
It is perhaps significant that although appellants 
outline at some length the details of Adamson vs. Brock-
bank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264; Stuck vs. Delta Land 
& Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791; and Ben-
nett vs. Bowen, 65 Utah 444, 238 Pac. 240 and cite them 
as authority in support of their right to reformation, all 
three cases either speak of or deal with rescission for a 
failure to arrive at a final bargain or for mistake and 
in none was the issue of reformation presented or eve"n 
discussed. 
It is alleged in the first count of the first cause of 
action in the Amended Complaint that appellants-buyers 
and respondents-sellers formulated an original agree-
ment on September 14, 1946. (Para. 3) This contract 
was denominated an Earnest l\ioney Receipt and Agree-
ment and is incorporated into the Amended Complaint 
by Paragraph 3. The parties thereto agreed in this first 
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contract to execute a second and final contract at a later 
date, and it is alleged that on October 28, 1946 the second 
contract, denominated a Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
was adopted. (Para. 8) This contract is incorporated 
into the Amended Complaint by Paragraph 8, and pro-
vides that the buyers were to receive a hotel, a restaur~ 
ant, and the personal property on the premises at that 
date, as enumerated in an attached inventory. Respon-
dents are alleged to have removed portions of the per-
sonalty from the hotel and restaurant between the dates 
of the initial agreement and final contract (Para. 10), 
and appellants now seek to reform the second contract 
to provide that they are to receive that personal property 
on the premises at the date of the original agreement. 
It is their position, and it is so alleged in Paragraph 
19, that the first contract (Earnest Money Receipt and 
Agreement) represented the final expression of intention 
between the parties. Therefore, if it appears from the 
Amended Complaint and its incorporated docum~nts 
that such was not the case, no right to reformation has 
been alleged because of the rule acquiesced in by appel-
lants that Equity will not reform a written instrument 
unless the complaining party can point to an agreement 
previously adopted.which was intended by the executing 
parties to be the final and conclusive expression of their 
intention. 
It is the position of respondents that the initial 
agreement was not a final one, that it was not so intended 
by the parties, and expressly so provides. 
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rrhe first ngTPPillPllt denominates itself a ''receipt'' 
and purports to be nothing· else. Appearing upon this 
document is the signature of a real estate agent, together 
'vith a statement that the real estate company is to be 
paid a commission. These features initially suggest 
that the agreement 'Yns clearly not intended by the par-
ties to contain all the terms of the final bargain. More 
important, ho,Yever, are the following factors which are 
significant in connection "Tith the language of the first 
agreement: 
1. Taxes were to be adjusted pro rata to the date 
of the second contract.· 
2. Interest on the unpaid balance " 7aS to run from 
the date of the second contract. 
3. The agreement speaks of the "date of closing" 
as the date of the second contract. 
4. ''Rents, insurance, interest, water, and other 
expenses of said propel'ty shall be pro rated as of the 
c/ a 1 '£. 0 ~ e J D'S / N f:{ 
days. after .exeg;uti~n. 
5. Sellers were given the right to change their 
minds and cancel the agreement any time within two 
days after execution. 
6. "Contract of Sale or Instrument of Conveyance 
to be made on the approved form of the Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board ... " 
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7. "It is understood and agreed that the terms 
written in this receipt constitute the entire prelimi.nar'!! 
contract between the Buyer and Seller ... '' 
The foregoing language makes it perfectly clear that 
the initial agreement "\Vas meant by the parties to be 
superceded and cancelled by provisions of a final con-
tract which they agreed to execute at a specified later 
date. It is uniformly held that a prior agreement and 
all intervening oral negotiations become merged into the 
final instrument. Landes & Co. vs. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 
19 P. 2d 389. This position seems to be conclusively 
indicated by the following clause in the original agree-, 
ment: 
"It is further agreed that the execution of 
final transfer papers abrogate this Earnest Money 
Receipt.'' 
The Amended Complaint contains no allegation in-
dicating that appellants are entitled to avoid these nu-
merous provisions of the initial ag!eement. Instead, ap-
pellants have adopted the anomolous position of urging 
the first agreement between the parties to be their final 
contract when that instrument expressly provides 1n 
unequivocal terms that such was not the case. 
It is submitted, then, that no right to reformation 
has been alleged. Appellants agree that as a matter of 
law reformation requires a prior and final understand-
ing in accordance with which the contract may be made 
to conform. They point to and allege the first agreement 
to be the concluding effort of the parties, yet they have, 
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despite repPated inYitations, aYoided answering, and in 
· their brief make no attempt to ans\\,.er, "'hat respondents 
consider to be a particularly rrucjal question: How can 
the first agreement be said to be final 'vhen that instru-
ment expressly proYides in clear, precise, and uncondi-
tional language that it 'Yns not so intended; that it was 
to be ''abrogated,' by execution of final transfer papers. 
In addition, it is perhaps important to examine 
briefly the effect of granting the reformation urged by 
appellants. The clause in the second contract sought to 
be reformed (''Together \vith all improvements, fixtures, 
equipment, signs, merchandise, and stock now on the 
premises; see attached Itemized List'') is perfectly clear 
and unambiguous. Further, this clause is the first of 
only four wholly typewritten terms in the entire instru-
ment; the balance of the contract is printed. It is the 
first descriptiYe clause in the document. 
The "attached Itemized List" referred to by the 
clause is an inventory which lists a total of 185 different 
types of personal property to be received by the buyers. 
This inventory serves to explain the term, ''Improve-
ments, fixtures, equipment, signs, merchandise, and 
stock.'' That is, the specific enumeration in the inventory 
defines and limits the general words of the contract 
clause. Lehi City vs. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530, 
341 (citing 19 C. J. 1255) ; 28 C. J. S. 1049 and cases cited. 
A copy of the inventory is attached to the original Com-
plaint and is part of the transcript on appeal. Appellants 
do not allege that they did not receive any of the items 
9 
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contained in the attached list, but complain that they 
did not receive a total of 79 different types of personal 
property not enumerated in the inventory. 
By asking for reformation, then, appellants seek not 
only to reform the first descriptive clause of the final 
contract, but also to avoid the language of the first agree-
ment which expressly provides that the second contract 
was designed and intended by the parties to be a final 
one, and in addition to add 79 different items to a de-
tailed and itemized inventory. Finally, they ignore that 
term in the final instrument which in effect provides 
that the agreement as reduced to writing represents the 
entire bargain between the parties. In other words, ap-
pellants seek to pick and choose among the terms of the 
two agreements and to supplement their choice by parol 
evidence with the net result that a completely different 
contract is created and the purchase price as to them is 
reduced by one-third. 
Therefore, it seems that appellants are asking the 
court to ignore the entire course of dealing between the 
parties as reduced to writing in two separate instru-
ments, and to construct for them a new and differe:r;tt con-
tract which the Amended Complaint and its incorporated 
documents show was unintended by the parties and one 
which would be entirely foreign to the objectives of the 
bargain. 
10 
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POINT 1-b 
THE DISTRICT COlTRT PROPERLY SUSTAIN-
ED RESPOXDEXTS' DE?\IURR.ER TO THE FIRST 
CO:UNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
THE RE .. \SO~ THAT AS A niATTER OF LAW, THE 
JURISDICTION OF EQUIT1T WILL NOT BE IN-
VOKED TO REFQR,:JI _A_ WRITTEN INSTRUMENT 
vVHEN I~r ... -\_!-)PEARS FR02\I THE ALLEGATIONS 
IX THE CO~IPLAINT THA'l·· THE COMPLAINING 
P.A_RTY HAS SLEPT ON HIS RIGHTS AND HAS 
BEEN SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAM-
AGE, IF ANY, RESULTING TO HI1\1SELF. 
In George YS. Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, 69 
Utah 460, 256 Pac. 400, defendant in his counter-claim 
prayed judgment for the reformation of a written con-
tract 'vhich the plaintiff was seeking to specifically en-
force against him. A period of 26 months had elapsed 
from the execution of the contract until the time when 
the defendant sought relief through reformation. This 
court indicated at page 467 that: 
''. . . the law is vvell settled in this and other 
jurisdictions that a written contract will be re-
formed to express the agreement of the parties 
v;,"'here the proof of the mistake is clear, definite, 
and convincing, and ~vhere the party seeking re-
formation is not guilty of negligence in the execu-
tion of the contract nor of laches in making timely 
application for its reformation.'' 
The reason for this position is outlined at page 471: 
''The general rule is that relief by way of 
reformation of a written instrument should not 
be granted where the party seeking it has 
acquiesced in the vvritten agreement after being 
a"· are of the mistake.'' 
11 
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-At page 472 the court, in speaking of defendant's right 
to reformation, said: ''And there were laches in not 
seeking timely relief . . . '' 
It is alleged in Paragraph 5 of the Amended Com-
plaint that appellants were to take possession of the 
premises on November 1, 1946. Paragraph 8 indicates 
that the final contract was executed on October 28, 1946, 
and Paragraph 17 states that upon entering into posses-
sion, appellant~ discovered an alleged deficiency in per-
sonal property. The transcript on appeal reveals that 
this action was initiated on ,June 23, 1949, a period of 32 
months after appellants are alleged to have discovered 
the mistake. This term of 32 montns' delay might well 
be contrasted with the period of 26 months involved in 
George vs. Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, supra, 
wherein it was held that the delay was unreasonably long. 
Because laches is· apparent from the face of the 
Amended Complaint and the transcript, it is proper to 
raise the issue by way of Demurrer on general grounds. 
Garrity vs. lVIiller, 204 Cal. 454, 268 Pac. 622; Kleinclaus 
vs. Dutard, 147 Cal. 245, 81 Pac. 516; Ewald vs. Kierulff, 
175 Cal. 363, 165 Pac. 942. 
The Amended Complaint is fatally defective because 
it demonstrates that appellants have slept on their rights, 
if any they had, and there is no allegation whatsoever 
explaining or seeking to excuse them from their laches. 
The jurisdiction of Equity should not now be available 
because of the delay, and respondents should not be 
forced to prove the validity of a. contract under which the 
12 
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parties haYe been operating· "Tithout dispute for a period 
of years. 
The purpose of the rule announced in George vs. 
Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, supra, is the burden it 
places upon a contracting party "Tho is oblig·ed to search 
for and come for"Tard \Yith proof of the validity of ~ 
written instrument after having placed his continued 
reliance upon the contract and having had no reason to 
belieYe that its terms 'vould be questioned in the future. 
The rule is not designed to punish but to prevent intoler-
able hardship, since after the lapse of a long period of 
time, it is easy to attack a "\Yritten document, but difficult 
to defend one. Any other rule would place a contracting 
party in the en-viable position of being able to determine 
before commencing an action whether or not the lapse of 
time has not made the other party unable to defend him-
self. It is to be normally expected that one experiencing 
an alleged loss of over $10,000.00 will come forward 
before a period of almost three years has elapsed. Appel-
lants are here asking the help of Equity in relieving them 
from their own written contract and yet have demon-
strated by their Amended Complaint that they are not 
entitled to assistance because of their delay. 
This court has consistently held that delay will bar 
Equity in suit for rescission based upon fraud. Skola 
vs. ~1erril, 91 Utah 253, 64 P. 2d 185, 192 ; Taylor vs. 
Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P. 2d 222, 226 (''To justify rescis-
sion, the party seeking to a vail himself of that remedy 
must move promptly and with all reasonable diligence 
13 
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... upon discovery of the fraud.'' Citing Utah cases.) 
This principle has equal npplication to suits for reforma-
tion. A contracting party cannot accept the benefits of 
the bargain indefinitely and then choose to completely 
revise the essential elements of the contract. 
Moreover, the Amended Complaint shows that the 
damage of which appellants complain was occasioned, if 
at all, as the result of their own neglect. Virtually the 
entire brief of appellants' is directed toward this matter. 
However, little more than a brief review of the Utah 
eases will be herein set forth. 
In Rushton vs. Hallett, 8 Utah 277, 30 Pac. 1014, 
plaintiff agreed to sell and defendant to buy real prop-
erty consisting of two tracts and a deed was prepared. 
Subsequently, defendant prepared a second deed wherein 
he was to be conveyed three tracts of land, and ''Falsely 
and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that the second 
deed was the same as the first mentioned deed." (At 281) 
Plaintiff, ''relying upon said false and fraudulent repre-
sentations," (at 281) signed the deed and later brought 
a suit to reform the second deed to conform with the 
first. Defendant demurrered on the ground that no cause 
of action had been alleged, and the District Court so held. 
On appeal to this court, plaintiff argued that, "Equity 
will reform a deed to make it conform to the intention 
of the parties." (At 278) The Supreme Court affirmed 
the order sustaining the demurrer holding that in an 
action to reform a written instrument the neglect of the 
complaining party may disqualify him, and the case is 
14 
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cited to that effert in 45 A.L.R. 701, 28 L.R.A. (NS) 799, 
and 13 Cyr. 680. This court said at page 283 : 
'' ... if the plaintiffs \vere imposed upon, it was 
their O\\Tn neglect. The complaint does not charge 
a mutual mistake, it charges fraud. If the plain-
tiffs \Yere defrauded, it \Yas their own fault en-
tirely. Therefore, I think that there is no equity 
stated in the complaint that calls for the inter-
ference of a court of chancery and, therefore, the 
demurrer \Yas properly sustained.'' 
The concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in Garner 
vs. Thomas, 94 Utah 295, 78 P. 2d 529 indicates that the 
pleader must sho\Y himself free from neglect. That opin-
ion refers to Baker Ys. Patton, 144 Ga. 542, 87 S. E. 659 
in which case reformation was sought for fraud and it 
was held that a Demurrer should have been sustained 
because of the neglect of the complaining party. The 
Georgia court stated at page 660 : 
"It is unneeessary to point out that petitioner 
does not rely upon a mutual mistake of fact to 
have the reformation of the writing ... He relies 
upon fraud of the other party ... In fact, the 
petitioner shows the grossest negligence on his 
part. . . . lT nder these circumstances, we do not 
think that petitioner is entitled to ... (reforma-
tion). And it was therefore error for the court 
to overrule the demurrer thereto.'' 
The opinion of Justice Wolfe further provides: 
''Reams vs. ~!cMinnville, 153 Tenn. 408, 284 
S. W. 382, 384 lays do,vn the sensible rule that, 
'The pleader must explain how the mistake was 
made, and show that he was without fault in the 
matter'." 
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Appellants themselves make reference in their brief 
to George vs. Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, 69 Utah 
460, 256 Pac. 400 which ease denied reformation based on 
mutual mistake because of neglect. The principles 
adopted in the above cases seem to be correct, since one 
seeking reformation of a written instrument is asking 
for an extraordinary remedy. His pleadings must sho~ 
that he is entitled to the intervening of Equity. 
It is submitted that the Amended Complaint is fatal-
ly defective because, (1) it contains no allegation indi-
cating that appellants were free from neglect or explain-
ing how the mistake was made, and (2) it conclusively 
shows that the injury of which they complain was pro-
duced as a result of their own carelessness. 
The inequitable conduct complained of consists of 
a refusal on two occasions to permit appellants an oppor-
tunity to examine the premises (Para. 6); statements by 
respondents as to the quantity of personal property and 
an accompanying refusal to permit an inventory on the 
day the final contract was executed. (Paras. 8 and 9) 
·Superimposed upon this is the alleged state of fact that 
appellants were unfamiliar with the restaurant and hotel 
business (Para. 2); that they were strangers in the com-
munity (Para. 16) ; that they executed the final contract 
on the premises i.mmediately after being denied a right 
to examine the property (Paras. 8 and 9) for the pur-
chase of which they obligated themselves to pay the sum 
of $35,000.00; and that they were imposed upon in gen-
eral. 
16 
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' 
Thus, appellants are alleged to have voluntarily 
executed a contract under g·rossly suspirious circum-
stances and 'Yithout haYing examined the premises they 
"~ere buying; a contrart "\Yhich "\Yas perfectly clear and 
unambiguous in eYery particular, and one executed after 
appellants had thoroughly informed themselves of its 
precise terms. In the "~ritten briefs submitted to the Dis-
trict Court, the follov..,.ing significant passage appears in 
appellants' brief at page 12: 
~'In the case at bar, the plaintiff not only read 
the document he signed, but before he signed it, 
he deliberately and carefully attempted to ascer-
tain "\Yhether that contract (the Real Estate Con-
tract) stated his bargain and conformed to the 
intentions of both parties.'' 
The fact that appellants are alleged to have been 
newcomers to the community and unfamiliar with the 
hotel business would not seem to place them in a better 
position. If anything, it obligates them to display ordi- . 
nary business prudence. 
It is not surprising that appellants admit in their 
brief to this Court on page 24: 
''It should be noted that in this case we have 
on one side a mistake which might easily have 
been said to be due to the parties' negligence ... '' 
To merely allege fraud will not entitle one to the 
assistance of Equity in reforming a written instrument. 
Rushton vs. Hallett, supra. 
17 
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• 
It would appear, therefore, that the District Court 
properly sustained respondents' demurrer since the 
jurisdiction of Equity is not now available to assist the 
appellants for the reason that they failed to institute a 
timely action and because the damage of which they com-
plain was occasioned, if at all, by their own neglect. 
In their brief, appellants have outlined in detail 
Stuck vs. Delta ·Land & Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 
227 Pac. 791; Bennett vs. Bowen, 65 Utah 444, 238 Pac. 
240; Beaver Drug Company vs. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217 
Pac. 695; Adamson vs. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 Pac. 
2nd '264; and Daly vs. Old, 35 Utah 79, 99 Pac. 460 in 
regard to the matter of the neglect of the complaining 
party. However, in all of these cases the action was 
either based upon the theory of rescission or damages 
and in none was the issue of reformation of a written 
instrument presented. It does not, therefore, seem worth-
while to examine them in search of precedent. 
POINT 1-c 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAIN-
ED RESPONDENTS' DEJYIURRER TO THE FIRST 
COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
THE REASON THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
REFORMING A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS 
NOT BEEN ALLEGED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
IF IT APPEARS THAT THE INSTRUMENT, WHEN 
REDUCED TO WRITING, WAS SUCH AS THE 
PARTIES THEMSELVES DESIGNED IT TO BE. 
Paragraphs 11, 13, and 15 of the Amended Com-
plaint reveal that appellants were aware of the terms 
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of the final contract; that they intended it to read as it 
was then worded; and that it represented the voluntary 
expression of their bargain. .Appell01nts knew that the 
second contract 1cas not the same as the first, (Para-
graphs 8, 11, and 15) and the disputed clause, the per-
sonal property "no"r on the premises," was deliberately 
and understandingly included in the instrument. We 
have, therefore, a case in which appellants are seeking 
to avoid the very language in which they voluntarily 
chose to express themselves. 
This count fails to state a cause of action for the 
reason that Equity will not reform a· written instrument 
when the terms contained therein are such as the parties 
designed them to be. The rule is stated in 5 Williston on 
Contracts 4343 (Rev. Ed., 1937) : 
"The province of reformation is to make a 
\Yriting express the bargain which the parties de-
sired to put in writing. Agreements of which they 
did not desire written expression will not be put 
into writing by decree of the court." 
This position is outlined to like effect in 65 Am. St. 
Rep.485: 
''While a court of chancery will, upon proof 
of fraud, accident, or surprise raise an equity by 
which an agreement will be rectified according to 
the intention of the parties, it will not interfere, 
~vhere the instrument is such as the parties them-
selves designed it to be. If they voluntarily chose 
to exp·ress thernselves in the language of a written 
contract, they must be bou.nd by it, for there is no 
general rule better settled or more just in itself, 
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than that parties who enter into contract, and 
especially contracts in writing, must be governed 
by them as made . . . '' 
In 53 C. J. 908 the principle is stated in the follow-
ing terms: 
"However, the instrument can only be re-
formed to conform to the parties' agreement, that 
is, it may only be reformed to express some ma-
terial thing whi~h the parties agreed upon and 
meant to put in, but left out, or by striking out or 
changing something they did not mean to express. 
A contract which the parties intended to make, 
but did not make, cantnot be set up in place of one 
which they did make, but did not intend to 
k '' ma e ... 
The Amended Complaint in no way suggests that 
the expression, the stock ''now on the premises,'' did not 
accurately describe the bargain. That is, the pleading 
shows that appellants knew that all they were to receive 
was the stock then on the premises. They complain, how-
ever, that respondents made oral representations con-
cerning the quantity of personal property, (Paras. 9, 10 
and 11) and that appellants ''wholly relied upon said 
representations ... and would not have entered into the 
... contract as it was then worded'' had they been aware 
of an alleged deficiency. (Para. 15) The available auth-
orities seem to agree that a. written instrument may not 
be reformed on the basis of these allegations. 
5 Willisto~ on Contracts 4343 (Rev. Ed., 1937) In-
dicates: 
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"Similarly, if the parties to a written instru-
ment understand that part of their previous 
agreement has been omitted from the writing and 
rely on oral agreement ''Tith one another to vary 
or add in certain respects to the written agree-
ment, w·hether they rely on moral obligation or 
believe that such a variation or addition is legally 
valid, equity cannot reform the writing by the 
insertion of the oral agreement.'' 
23 R. C. L. 311 provides : 
''The court in recognizing the equity (of re-
formation) cannot make such a contract as it 
thinks the parties ought to have made or would 
have made if better informed .... Neither will the 
court insert a provision which was omitted with 
the consent of the party asking for reformation, 
although such consent was given in reliance on 
oral promise of. the other party that the omissio~ 
should not make any difference.'' 
5 Williston on Contracts, 4~41 (Rev. Ed., 1937) 
points out: 
· "It is not enough to j~tstify reformation that 
the court is satisfied that the parties would have 
come to a certain agreement had they been aware 
of the act-ual facts." 
The Amended Complaint does not proceed upon the 
theory that the instrument as written was designed or 
intended by the parties to read otherwise than as it did, 
or that it did not accurately represent the bargain. In-
stead, it is complained that appellants were mistaken as 
to how much stock was then present. It would seem, 
therefore, that the pleading if anything would go to the 
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/ 
existence of the contract because of mistake as to the 
subject matter rather than to the reformation of it. 
It is clear that the instrument as written was such 
as the parties voluntarily intended it to be and it cannot, 
for that reason, be altered. This is a necessary principle 
in contract law, since to hold otherwise would oblige one 
to enter a contract at the peril of the .other party's later 
reforming the instrument on the basis that he did not 
mean what he said, but meant something entirely dif-
ferent all along. 
It is not sufficient in seeking to allege a right to 
relief by way of reformation simply by outlining the 
elements of fraud. A written instrument incorporating 
those provisions which the contracting parties desire is 
not made less valid merely by complaining that it was 
the product of unfair conduct. It is, therefore, submitted 
that no right to reformation has been alleged. 
POINT 1-d 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUSTAIN-
ED RESPONDEN-TS' DEMURRER TO THE FIRST 
COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
THE REASON THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
REFORMING A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS 
NOT BEEN STATED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
WHEN THE ALLEGED RIGHT TO REFORMATION 
IS BASED UPON ORAL REPRESENTATIONS AND 
THE INSTRUMENT ITSELF DEMONSTRATES 
THAT NO SUCH REPRESENTATIONS HAVE 
BEEN MADE. 
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Paragraphs 9 to 16 of the Amended Complaint in 
substance allege that respondents made certain oral rep-
resentations to appellants concerning the quantity of 
personal property on the premises at the time of the 
execution of the final contract. It is then alleged that 
appellants 'vere induced to believe the truth of the state-
ments; (Para. 11) that they signed the contract on the 
faith of oral representations, (Para. 15) ; and that they 
are, therefore, entitled to reformation of the contract 
because, other than for the alleged representations, they 
would not have executed the instrument. (Paras. 11 and 
15.) The following clause is contained in the final con-
tract relating to this issue: 
''It is hereby expressly understood and agreed 
by the parties hereto that ... there are no repre-
sentat-ions, covenants, or agreements between the 
parties hereto with rreference to said property, 
except as herein specifically set forth or attached 
hereto.'' 
The Amended Complaint contains no allegation to 
the effect that appellants are entitled to avoid this 
language and are not bound by it. It is, therefore, sub-
mitted that the instrument may not be reformed on the 
basis of oral representations or on the basis of a prior 
agreement when the instrument itself expressly provides 
that no such representations nor agreements have been 
made. 
POINT 2 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUS-
TAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE 
SECOND COUNT OF THE,FIRST CAUSE OF AC-
T'ION IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE 
l~EASON THAT THIS COUNT FAILED TO STATE 
A CA,USE OF ~\_CTION. 
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The second count of the first cause of action is one 
in tort wherein it is alleged that respondents made cer-
tain oral representations to appellants concerning the 
quantity of personal property on the premises (Paras. 
2 and 7), and that relying on those representations, ap-
pellants ''executed said Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and were damaged ... " (Para. 11) This count fails to 
state a cause of action for three reasons: 
First, it is not alleged that appellants had a right 
to rely upon respondents' representations. A cause of 
action in Utah based upon actionable fraud must include 
that element. Kinnear vs. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 Pac. 2d 
1094, 1095; Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 
490, 505, 227 Pac. 791. This principle is admitted by 
appellants in their brief at pages 21 and 35. 
In count two of the Amended Complaint it is alleged 
that the representations were false, material, intentional, 
relied upon, and that damage resulted. However, it is 
not alleged in any portion of this count, either directly 
or by inference, that appellants were entitled to rely 
upon the alleged representations. This count, therefore, 
fails to state a cause of action. 
Secondly, the stated facts show that appellants can-
not now claim to have been deceived or that they were 
entitled to rely upon the alleged representations. Para-
graph 1 of the second count (incorporating Paras. 4 and 
5 of the first count) alleges that respondents stated to 
appellants that all the personalty on the premises at the 
date of the original agreement would be conveyed and 
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that none \Yould be removed during respondents' interim 
possession. It is then alleged (incorporating Para. 6) 
that appellants 'vent to the premises for the purpose of 
conducting an inventory, but were refused admission by 
respondents, and that they returned and were again 
denied access. Further, on one occasion (Para. 7 as in-
corporated) appellants commenced an inventory of their 
own; that is, they chose not to rely upon respondents' 
alleged representations. Paragraphs 2 of the second 
count then indicates that respondents repeated the repre-
sentations concerning the quantity of personal property, 
but that appellants again demanded a right of inspec-
tion. This demand was refused and the parties then 
executed the contract while on the premises. It is sub-
mitted that these facts demonstrate that appellants can-
not now urge that they were deceived or that they relied 
or had a right to rely upon the alleged representations. 
''To maintain an action for fraudulent repre-
sentations, it is not only necessary to establish the 
telling of the untruth, knowing it to be such, o~ 
that it was told ""\\rithout knowledge of the facts, 
but also to prove that the plaintiff had a right to 
rely upon it, and did so rely ... '' (Citing cases) 
Dyck vs. Snygg, 138 Neb. 121, 292 N.W. 119, 123. 
The Amended Complaint clearly shows that the al-
leged representations were accompanied with circum-
stances so outrageously suspicious as to cast serious 
doubt upon the truth of the statements. Of course, one 
is not obliged to assume that he 'vill be abused by fraud. 
However, he cannot, after his suspicion is aroused, com-
plain that he is entitled to rely upon the representations 
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made to him. "It is difficult to believe that the plain-
tiff is as credulous as he claims.'' Skola vs. Merrill, 91 
Utah 253, 64 P. 2d 185, 192. ''One cannot close his eyes 
to the obvious and then claim to be deceived." Del Rio 
vs. Ulen Contracting Corp., 94 F. 2d ( CCA Tex.) 701, 
703. This is particularly true in the light of the fact that 
appellants admittedly questioned, if they did not thor-
oughly disbelieve, the statements imputed to respondents, 
this being evidenced by repeated demands for an exami-
nation of the property for the avowed purpose of con-
firming the representations made concerning it. The 
relevant cases seem to support the conclusions above 
stated. 
''Does the evidence show that the defendant 
... had sufficient knowledge to require an investi-
gation or inquiry on her part before becoming a 
purchaser .... Where circumstances of a question-
able nature, creating a suspicion of fraud, come 
to the attention of one whose duty it is to investi-
gate, and where, if inquiry were made, the facts 
constituting the fraud would be disclosed, and 
such person fails to make such inquiry, the law 
charges him with full knowledge of whatever facts 
pertaining to the fraud would have been dis-
closed." United States vs. Conklin, 54 Fed. Supp. 
(D. C. Mont.) 500, 502. 
"Restatements of the fraudulent representa-
tion do not themselves constitute concealment, and 
where a party is once put upon notice of fraud he 
cannot avoid the consequences of his constructive 
knowledge of the fraud nor fulfill his duty to in-
vestigate by going to the party he suspects of the 
fraud. He cannot desist from further investiga-
. tion because he is reassured of the truth of the 
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original representations.'' (Citing cases) Feak 
vs. l\Iarion Steam Shov. Co., 84 F. 2d ( C.C.A. 
Ore.) 670, 673. 
"The rule is universally recognized in fraud 
cases that "'"here the buyer is aware of suspicious 
circumstances or has learned of the falsity of one 
or more of the representations, he . . . may not 
rely upon the statements of the seller." Carpen-
ter vs. Hamilton, 18 Cal. App. 2d 69, 62 P. 2d 
1397, 1401. 
"If (the party alleging fraud) becomes aware 
of facts that tend to arouse his suspicion, or if he 
has reason to believe that any representations 
made to him are false or only half true ... he has 
no right to rely on statements of the other con-
tracting party. Cameron vs. Cameron, 88 Cal. 
App. 2d 585, 199 P. 2d 443, 44 7. 
Statements to the same effect are set forth in United 
States vs. Krueger, 228 Fed. (C.C.A. Colo.) 97, 103 and 
Dyck vs. Snygg, supra., at 123 (N.W.). 
Appellants cannot improve their position merely by 
asserting that they had no access and were therefore 
forced to rely upon the alleged representations. The fact 
that they were repeatedly and without valid reason de-
nied a right of inspection only aggravates the suspicious 
character of the events rather than placing appellants 
in a better light. 
Moreover, the fact that appellants are alleged to 
have commenced an inventory (Para. 7 as incorporated) 
withdraws from their right to rely. Wells vs. Lloyd, 125 
P. 2d 128, 134 (Cal. 1942) (''In view of the act that Bay 
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Cities commenced its investigation it cannot be said that 
it placed reliance upon any representations.'') The 
reason for this principle is that in a judicial contest, it 
would be thorouglily impossible to determine how much 
knowledge the investigation had revealed and it would 
be impossible to discover how much the buyer relied 
upon his own investigation and how much he relied upon 
the alleged statements. 
It is submitted that appellants cannot now, years 
thereafter, be heard to say that they were deceived Q.r 
that they were entitled to rely upon statements allegedly 
made to them for the following reasons clearly revealed 
upon the face of the pleading: (1) The representations 
made were accompanied with grossly suspicious circum-
stances squarely directed at the veracity· of the state-
ments; (2) Appellants admittedly questioned the truth 
of the statement upon which they now seek to rely; that 
is, appellants are alleged to have relied upon represen-
tations which they themselves· doubted to be true; and 
(3) Appellants commenced an independent investigation 
and must be conclusively presumed to have relied upon 
the information obtained therefrom or, in the alterna-
tive, be charged with the knowledge it would have re-
vealed if diligently pursued to completion. 
Beaver Drug Co. vs. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217 Pac. 
695, is the only case cited by appellants in support of 
the second count (page 35 of appellants' brief), and it 
is clearly distinguishable. In that case plaintiff was 
entitled to rely and did rely upon rep res en ta tions made 
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to him since he had no reason to question the truth of 
the statements. Appellants here cannot successfully 
assert that they did rely or 'vere entitled to rely upon 
the Yery representations "Thich appeared to be untrue, 
and which w·ere, in fact, seriously questioned. Further, 
if appellants in the present action had completed the 
investigation once begun, it would have revealed to them 
the alleged inventory shortage of which they complain. 
In the Beaver Drug case, this was not true· because the 
representations dealt with the val~te ~f a stock of drugs 
and in that action it would have required expert assist-
ance to discover the falsity of the representations and, 
in fact, an expert was retained for the precise purpose 
of determining the worth of the drugs. In order to allege 
a cause of action in deceit, it must be made to appear 
that the damage complained of directly resulted from 
reliance placed upon representations and that this re-
lianee was justified. One cannot show himself entitled 
to relief by complaining that his damage resulted from 
statements which he had every reason to doubt and when, 
in fact, he did entertain doubt. Yet this is precisely the 
substance of the second count. 
Third, the eontract itself demonstrates that no rep-
resentations were made. Because the tort is alleged to 
arise from a contract and because that contract is made 
a part of the second count, it seems proper to examine 
the language of the instrument for relevant terms. 
"It is hereby expressly understood arnd agreed 
by the parties hereto that ... there are no repre-
.sen.tations . . . between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property.'' 
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It is perhaps significant to note that this clause does 
not merely provide that the parties are precluded from 
demonstrating representations if any have been made; 
it provides that ''there are no representations.'' The 
term is not, therefore, open to attack on the basis of its 
being unfair or invalid as precluding proof of the factors 
which induced a contract. Appellants now seek, in count 
two, to depart completely from this language without first 
alleging that they are entitled to avoid, reform, or strike 
it from the contract. This court said in Strike vs. White, 
91 Utah 170, 175, 63 Pac. 2d 600, that a written instrument 
may be reformed under appropriate circumstances, "but 
until that is done, the parties are bound by its terms.'' 
The clause, in addition, serves as another method 
by which Beaver Drug Co. vs. Hatch, supra, may be 
distinguished since, in that case, no contract term of this 
type a ppea.red in the bargain between the parties. 
For. the above reasons it is submitted that the second 
count fails to state a cause of action. 
POINT 3 
THE DISTRIC~, COURT PROPERLY SUS-
TAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE 
THIRD COUNT OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE 
REASON THAT THIS COUNT FAILED TO STATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE AMENDED COM-
PLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT THIS COUNT 
FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The third count of the first cause of action in appel-
lants' Amended Complaint takes the form of a contract 
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action for breach of 'Yarranty. Paragraph 2 alleges that 
respondents ''represented and warranted'' concerning 
the quantity of personal property on the premises, and 
in their brief, appellants define the nature of the alleged 
\Yarranty as " ... an affirmation of fact that is a repre-
sentation, is a "'"arranty ... " (Page 36) This count 
fails to state a cause of action for three reasons: 
First, because the alleged warranty is said to arise 
from respondents' representations, it seems proper to 
again refer to the terms of the principal contract: 
"It is hereby expressly understood and agreed 
that ... There are no representations, covenants, 
or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property . . . '' 
This language expressly provides that there are no 
representations and the third count appears defective 
since it is not alleged that appellants are enti tied to 
avoid, reform or strike this clause from the contract. 
It has been the position of appellants that this term 
is ineffective and should be ignored. However, this over-
looks the fact that a clause of this nature is given ~ffect 
by the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 81-6-1 : 
"Where any right, duty or liability would 
arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implica-
tion of law, it may be negatived or varied by ex-
press agreement.'' 
Secondly, the Amended Complaint demonstrates an 
acceptance by appellants of the delivered personal prop.;. 
erty, the effect of \vhich is to relieve respondents from 
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liability or an alleged breach of warranty. Sec. 81-3-8 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943 provides in part: 
"The buyer is deemed to have accepted the 
goods when ... (they) have been delivered to 
him, and he does any act in relation to them which 
is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, 
or when after the lapse of a reasonable time, he 
retains the goods without intimating to the seller 
that he has rejected them." 
Since the facts are undisputed for the purposes of 
this Demurrer, the question of an acceptance is properly 
one for the court. Foell Packing Co. vs. Harris, 127 Pa., 
Supra, 494, 193 Atl. 152. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the third 
" 
count allege that appellants took possession of the goods 
on October 28, 1946 and the transcript on appeal indi-
cates that this action was commenced on June 23, 1949, 
a lapse of 32 months. 
It is not alleged that the goods were rejected or 
protest made, and the act of appellants in retaining 
the personal property constitutes an acceptance. Pur-
suant to identical statutory provisions, it was held in 
Knobel vs. I. Bartel Co., 176 Wis. 393, 187 N.W. 188, 
that a buyer's failure to reject delivered goods after 
having them in his possession for 25 days constituted 
acceptance as a matter of law. The same result was 
reached as a matter of law, in Milz vs. Bloomfield, 146 
Misc. 649, 262 N. Y. S. 580 (three weeks); Matchless 
Electric Co. vs. Morley, 252 Mich. 144, 233 N.W. 202 (two 
months); Tegan vs. Chapin, 176 Wis. 410, 187 N.W. 185 
(57 days); Goodlotte vs. Acme Sales Corp., 229 Ill. App. 
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610 ( 6 months) ; and Kirsch vs. Coon, 111 Conn. 564, 150 
.A.tl. 523 (one year). The Amended Complaint, therefore, 
demonstrates that as a matter of la'v appellants made 
an acceptance of the delivered goods. 
The effect of an acceptance is stated in Section 81-
3-9 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943: 
''In the absence of express or implied agree-
ment of the parties, acceptance of the goods by 
the buyer shall not discharge the seller from lia-
bility in damages or other legal remedy for breach 
of any promise or warranty in the contrae:t to sell 
or the sale. But if after acceptance of the. goods, 
the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the 
breach of a;ny promise or warranty within a 
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ough.t 
to know of such breach, the seller shall not be 
liable there fore. 
This proYision of the Sales Act defines the rights· 
of the parties in instances such as this where a breach 
of "rarranty is alleged against a seller of personal prop-
erty, (Rothenberg vs. Shapiro, 140 N.Y.S. +48) and 
notice promptly forthcoming from the buyet is a vital 
condition precedent to recovery. March Wood Products 
Co. vs. Babcock Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (it is an 
"absolute condition.") ; W. S. Maxwell Co. vs. Southern 
Oregon Gas Co., 158 Or. 168, 74 P. 2d 594. The failure 
to allege prompt notice is a matter which may properly 
be raised by Demurrer (Holland vs. Good Brothers, 318 
Mass. 300, 61 N.E. 2d 544), and the question as to 
whether an unreasonable time has elapsed may be re-
solved by the court. Marmet Coal Co. vs. People's Coal 
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Co., 226 Fed. ( C.C.A. Ohio) 646; American Rag Co. vs. 
U.S. Hoffman Machine Co., 320 Ill. App. 556,'. 51 N.E. 2d 
809. 
Allegations of fraud do not dispense with the need 
for notice, and even the fact that a seller of goods may J,e 
allege:tto have had lrnowledge of his own does not alter 
the operation of the statute. American Mfg. Co. vs. V. S. 
Shipping Board Emergency Corp., 7 F. 2d (C.C.A.N.Y.) 
565; Simoz vs. Brockman, 249 Wis. 50, 23 N.E. 464. 
This section of the code requires notice ''of the 
breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable 
time after the seller knows, or ought to know, of such 
breach.'' The Amended Complaint does not allege that 
appellants gave notice of a warranty breach or protested 
or rejected the goods. Instead, paragraph 3 of the third 
count alleges that ''upon. entering into the possessio~ 
of the premises . . . ' ' in October, 1946 the alleged breach 
of warranty was discovered. On June 23, 1949 a differ-
. 
ence in time of 32 months, the original Complaint was\ 
filed, it being the first notice communicated to re-
spondents. 
As a matter of law, an unreasonable period of time 
has elapsed and the cases constituting this section of 
the Sales Act uniformly so hold. Silberman vs. Engel, 
125 Misc. 816, 211 N.Y.S. 584 (39 days). Harburger vs. 
Stern, 189 N.Y.S. 74 (7 months); Stewart vs. Menzel, 
181 Minn. 347, 232 N.W. 522 (7 months); Tegan vs. 
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Chapin, 176 ''Tisr. 410, 187 N.W. 185 (57 days); see lA 
[ln,ifor-tn La,lcs --..lnn. (Sales) 107 et. seq. 
The .... \mended Complaint on its face, therefore, 
demonstrates (1) an acceptance of the personal property 
delivered, and ( 2) a failure to protest within a reason-
able time. The pleading is fatally defective as a matter 
of law, pursuant to the Sales Act as adopted in Utah. 
Although the cases cited above are from foreign 
jurisdiction, it seems appropriate to refer to them,. 
since it was held in Stewart vs. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 
218 Pac. 959, 44 A.L.R. 340 that in an effort to give the 
Sales Act uniform application, it is proper to consider 
the interpretations placed upon identical provisions by 
courts in other states. In addition, Section 7 4 of the 
Uniform Sales Act provides: 
'' (The Sales Act) shall be so interpreted and 
construed as to effectuate its general purpose and 
make uniform the laws of those states which enact 
"t " l ~ 
Third, even In the absence of these provisions of 
the Utah Code, and of the disclaimer term in the con-
tract, the third count still fails to state a cause of action. 
Appellants arg11e in their brief at page 37 that, "The 
written contract has left the quantity of stock uncertain 
and resort must be had to the oral statement as to quan-. 
tity to complete the agreement." The clause to which 
appellants refer as uncertain provides: 
''Together with all improvements, fixtures, 
equipment, signs, .merchandise, and stock now on 
the premises; see attached Itemized List.'' 
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It is respondents' position that this clause and the 
attached inventory are perfectly clear and unambiguous 
in every particular and that, as a result, it would be 
improper as a matter of law to add, by parol evidence, 
79 other types of personal property to the inventory. 
Appellants contend that the expression ''stock and 
merchandise'' is ambiguous because the attached inven-
tory contains no items which, they argue, are normally 
associated with those terms, and that these items may 
properly be added. However, it seems correct to sug-
gest that appellants may not impute a meaning to the 
terms of the contract entirely different than that which 
the contract gives them. That is, the inventory serves 
to explain the contract clause since the specific enumera-
tion defines the general terms in the clause. Lehi City 
vs. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530, 541 (citing 19 C.J. 
1255); 28 C.J.S. 1049 citing cases. 
In Landes & Co. vs. Fallo"rs, 81 Utah 432, 19 P. 2d 
389, 392, the court said : 
''If, on the other hand, the contract of sale 
specifically designates the subject-matter of the 
transaction, such designation must control and 
cannot be enlarged by construction. ' ' 
Further, it is significant that most of the damages 
sought by appellants is for equipment such as a tool 
chest, electric griddle, radiators, stoves, rifle, a utomo-
bile, etc., which items could clearly not be denominated 
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''merchandise and stock'' under the meaning imputed 
to that expression by appellants. 
For the above three reasons, it is believed that the 
District Court properly sustained respondents' Demur-
rer to the third count. 
POINT 4 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SUS-
TAINED RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER TO THE 
SECOND CAUSE OF .ACTION IN THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT NO CAUSE 
OF ACTION HAD BEEN ALLEGED. 
Appellants' second cause of action IS alleged to 
arise from the failure of a heating system on the 
premises to conform to the standard of quality imputed 
to it by respondents. In their brief appellants have not 
argued against the order of the District Court in sus-
taining Demurrer to this cause of action and no argu-
ment will be made except to indicate that Paragraph 2 
of that cause of action incorporates the final contract 
into the Amended Complaint and a term of that instru-
ment provides : 
"It is hereb yexpressly understood and agreed 
that the buyer accepts the said property in its 
present condition ... '' 
The Amended Complaint does not allege that appel-
lants are entitled to avoid this language, and it would 
therefore appear that no cause of action has been stated. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the District Court 
properly sustained respondents' Demurrer and correctly 
denied le.ave to amend for the reason that no portion of 
the Amended Complaint alleges a cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L.C.MONTGOMERY 
Heber, Utah 
EDWARD L. MONTGOMERY 
Detroit, Michigan 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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